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RECENT DECISIONS
Corporations -

Voting Trusts and Subchapter S

Petitioners, owners of all of the outstanding stock of the A & N Furniture and Appliance Company, an Ohio corporation, elected in 1958 to
have the income of the corporation taxed to them as individuals in accordance with subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code.1 In 1961 they
entered into a voting trust agreement pursuant to section 1701.49 of the
Ohio Revised Code. The trustee was given the irrevocable right to vote all
of the shares of each shareholder for a period of ten years. Under section
1372 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code, the shareholders listed certain deductions on their personal income tax returns that were actually losses
that the corporation suffered. The Commissioner refused to allow these
deductions on the ground that the voting trust created by the shareholders prevented A & N from qualifying as a small business corporation under
section 1371 (a). Held: A small corporation which has chosen to be treated
as a proprietorship for tax purposes under subchapter S (sections 13711377) of the Internal Revenue Code, does not forfeit that election by
creating a voting trust with all the stockholders participating. A & N
Furniture &q Appliance Co. v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 40 (S.D. Ohio
1967).
Congress enacted subchapter S to allow small businesses to select the
form of organization desired, without having to take into account major
differences in tax consequences. In order to qualify under subchapter S a
small business must not (1) have more than ten shareholders, (2) have as
a shareholder a person who is not an individual, (3) have a non-resident
alien as a shareholder, and (4) have more than one class of stock. The government based its argument that the voting trust disqualified the company
on two grounds. First, the claim was made that the voting trust created
a separate class of stock in violation of section 1371 (a) (4). Second, the
contention was made that the voting trust was, in effect, a shareholder
other than an individual and this violated section 1371 (a) (2).s
The court rejected both of the government's contentions. The argument that the voting trust agreement created a separate class of stock was
refuted on the ground that the regulation was not intended to apply to
voting trusts, but rather to a corporation which issues two classes of
stock. The court stated:
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§

1371-77. The pertinent part of S 1371 reads:
(a) Small Business Corporation. For purposes of this subchapter, the term 'small
business corporation' means a domestic corporation which is not a member of an
affiliated group . . . and which does not(1) have more than 10 shareholders;
(2) have as a shareholder a person . . . who is not an individual;

(4) have more than one class of stock.
2 271 F. Supp. 40, 42 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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It is clear that Congress was not at all concerned with the respective voting
power of each shareholder in a small corporation. They were only concerned
that the businesses taking the Subchapter S election be those small businesses
which Congress intended to benefit, and that no accounting complications
result, and although the regulation (1.1371-1 (g)) speaks of 'voting rights,'
it appears clear to this court that it is directed toward the issuance of two
classes of stock, and accounting difficulties resulting therefrom, rather than
voting power per se. 8
The government's second contention that the voting trust created a
"shareholder" other than a person under section 1371 (a) (2) was dismissed by the court on the basis that there was no reason why a voting
trust should be considered a shareholder.4 Therefore, in accord with the
purpose of subchapter S to allow small businesses to operate in whatever
form they see fit, without having to take into account prohibitive tax
consequences, a voting trust was not held sufficient reason to disallow a
small corporation the use of subchapter S.'
G.E.S.

Family Law -

Contraception as Grounds for Divorce

Plaintiff sought a divorce on grounds of extreme cruelty, alleging that
for two years, beginning with the inception of the marriage, her husband
insisted she take contraceptive pills as a condition precedent to his engaging
in marital relations. The husband constantly supervised the pill-taking
ritual. The plaintiff acquiesced in her husband's demands in the short-lived
hope that he would change his mind. Held, judgment nisi entered: A husband's insistence that his wife take contraceptive pills as a condition precedent to engaging in marital relations constitutes grounds for a divorce
predicated upon extreme cruelty. Goldstein v. Goldstein, 97 N.J. Super.
537, 235 A.2d 498 (Ch. 1967).
In the United States wilful refusal to consummate the marriage is nowhere an express ground for annulment or divorce, nor is refusal to copulate without contraceptives. Nevertheless, if a husband or wife, contrary
to his partner's wishes, insists upon precautionary measures as a prerequisite
to coitus, the latter spouse may not be without remedy. Possible recourse
may be obtained through an annulment for fraud, a divorce for desertion,
or a divorce for cruelty.1
In most states a consummated marriage can be annulled on the ground
of fraud if it "goes to the essentials" of the marriage relationship.! A number of cases have held that the requisite fraud exists where one party has
expressly and falsely promised before marriage that he would have chil3

Id. at 45.
4id. at 46.
5
rd. at 43.
' See Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 227 (1949).

'G. CLARK, DOMESTiC RELATIONS § 15 (1954). An unconsummated marriage may be annulled for any fraud which would be sufficient to annul an ordinary contract. 4 AM. JuR. 2o
Annulment of Marriage § 13 (1962).
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dren afterward.' In several cases the courts have carried the reasoning one
step further and have granted an annulment on the ground of fraud
where the promise to have children was merely implied.4
Although the general rule with respect to divorce is that a refusal to
have children does not of itself constitute desertion, one jurisdiction,' New
Jersey, has ruled that a refusal, persisted in for the statutory period, to
have sexual intercourse without the use of contraceptive devices, constitutes desertion.! This rule represents an extension of the doctrine that a
wilful refusal to have any sexual contact constitutes desertion if continued
for the statutory period. The latter rule, which is recognized by a substantial minority of jurisdictions,7 has been justified primarily on the
ground that a platonic marriage cannot accomplish a major purpose of
wedlock, namely the procreation of children s Apparently, New Jersey
would equate copulation accompanied by contraception for the statutory
period with a total lack of copulation, for both "deprive the marriage of
...its most important object .. . [progeny]."'
The avoidance of procreation of children by one spouse over the objections of the other, or the refusal of one spouse to engage in sexual intercourse unless contraception is practiced, does not, as a rule, authorize the
granting of a divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty." However, with
the decision in the instant case, New Jersey has apparently extended its
parochial view of contraception to include the granting of a divorce predicated upon extreme cruelty. The ineptly written decision" seems to recognize the existence of a fraudulent intent on the part of the husband in
that his wife was under the delusion her mate possessed paternal instincts.
The significance of this factual finding in relation to the court's ultimate
decision is obscure, and until a more prolific opinion is rendered by a New
Jersey court, an understanding of the status of this area of divorce law
will remain impregnable.
F.W.B.
'See Stegienko v. Stegienko, 295 Mich. 530, 295 N.W. 252 (1940); Coppo v. Coppo, 163
Misc. 249, 297 N.Y.S. 744 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
4See, e.g., Pisciotta v. Buccino, 22 N.J. Super. 114, 91 A.2d 629 (Super. Ct. 1952); Lembo
v. Lembo, 193 Misc. 1055, 86 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup. Ct. 1949). It should be noted that waiver
is a defense to both express and implied fraud. Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 227, 233 (1949).
'Harrington v. Harrington, 38 Del. 333, 192 A. 555 (Super. Ct. 1937).
6Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (Ch. 1942). The Kreyling rule has
been restricted slightly by the subsequent case of Kirk v. Kirk, 39 N.J. Super. 341, 120 A.2d
854 (Super. Ct. 1956), which held that the plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he strongly objected to the defendant's conduct throughout the statutory desertion period. In
the Kirk case the petitioner was denied a divorce for failing to meet this requirement.
'27A C.J.S. Divorce § 36(3) (1959).
8Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800 (Ch. 1942); Raymond v. Raymond,
79 A. 430 (N.J. Ch. 1909).
'Kreyling v. Kreyling, 20 N.J. Misc. 52, 23 A.2d 800, 803-04 (Ch. 1942).
"5See, e.g., Thomas v. Thomas, 219 Ala. 196, 121 So. 710 (1929); Lohmuller v. Lohmuller,
135 S.W. 751 (Tex. Civ. App. 1911). However, there are some factual situations in which refusal of one spouse to engage in completed normal sexual intercourse has been held to constitute
cruelty. E.g., Longtin v. Longtin, 22 N.Y.S.2d 827 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
sa The ambiguous wording of the court resulted in an incorrect set of headnotes accompanying
the opinion.
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Federal Rule 65(d)'s Requirement of

Petitioner, a union representing Philadelphia longshoremen, had entered
into a collective bargaining agreement in 1959 with the respondent, an
association of employers in the port of Philadelphia. A dispute arose over
the meaning of provisions for compensating longshoremen who are told
upon reporting for duty that they will not be needed until the afternoon.
The union contended that these "set-back" provisions meant that longshoremen whose employment was postponed due to inclement weather were
entitled to four hours pay. The association argued that the provisions guaranteed the longshoremen no more than one hour's pay under such circumstances. In order to resolve this disagreement, the parties followed the grievance procedure set out by their contract and submitted the matter to an
arbitrator for a final determination. The arbitrator ruled that the association's contention was correct. However, one month later certain union
members refused to unload a ship unless their employer would guarantee
four hours pay for having set back their starting time from 8 a.m. to
1 p.m. The association instituted proceedings in the district court to enforce the original arbitrator's decision. After a temporary settlement between the parties the problem arose again and the association requested an
order by the court to require the union to comply with the arbitrator's
award. The district court entered a decree requiring the union "to comply
with and to abide by the said Award." When the court indicated that such
a decree would be issued, counsel for the union asked the court for clarification as to the actual meaning of the order, but the district judge refused to explain the meaning of the order.
Later, further set-back disputes occurred and the district court issued
a rule to show cause why the union and its officer should not be held in
contempt for violating the order. At the contempt hearing the judge refused again to explain his order and adjudged the union in civil contempt.
The court of appeals affirmed the original decree of the district court' and
its contempt order.' The United States Supreme Court reversed: Rule
65 (d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a federal court
issuing an order granting an injunction or a restraining order clearly set
forth the reasons for its issuance. Therefore, the parties who must obey
them will know what the court intends to require and what it means to

prohibit. International Longshoremen's Association, Local 1291 v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Association, 389 U.S. 64 (1967).
In reaching its decision the court stated that rule 65 (d) was designed to
prevent the type of confusion that clouded the command of the district
court. Rule 65 (d) provides:
Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall set forth
the reasons for its issuance; shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail, and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act
1

365 F.2d 295 (3d Cir. 1966).

368 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1966).
2 243 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Pa. 1965), aff'd,
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or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the
action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon
those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.
The Court felt that the order in question "clearly failed to comply with
that rule, for it did not state in 'specific . . . terms' the acts that it required or prohibited." 3 The Court went on to point out that the judicial
contempt power is a "potent weapon" and can be dangerous when founded
upon an order which is too vague to be understood. To avoid this, Congress enacted rule 65 (d) to require a federal court to frame its orders so
that the parties will understand just what is intended. Since the district
court's decree was not in accord with this principle, it was struck down.
In closing the court stated: "The most fundamental postulates of our
legal order forbid the imposition of a penalty for disobeying a command
that defies comprehension."'
G.E.S.

Taxation Tax Court

Accumulated Earnings -

Burden of Proof in

Section 531 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes a tax' on the
accumulated taxable income' of every corporation "formed or availed of
for the purpose of avoiding the income tax with respect to its shareholders ... by permitting earnings and profit to accumulate instead of being
divided or distributed."' Exceptions are made in the case of personal holding companies,4 foreign personal holding companies,' and tax exempt corporations as defined in subchapter F.' Section 533 of the Code' creates
two presumptions: (1) the fact that earnings and profits are accumulated
"beyond the reasonable needs of business"' is determinative of the purpose of tax avoidance with respect to shareholders unless the corporation
proves the contrary by a preponderance of the evidence;' and (2) the fact
that a corporation is "a mere holding or investment company"" is prima
facie evidence of the purpose of tax avoidance with respect to its shareholders.1 These presumptions are in addition to the presumption of correctness attaching to the Commissioner's determination of tax deficiency
3 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967).
4 id.
'The

tax is levied at the rate of 271/3% of the first $100,000 of accumulated taxable income

and 38 '/z
531.
2
8

of accumulated taxable income in excess of $100,000. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, §

Id. § 535.

4 1d. S

1d.
Id.
7 I1d.
1d.
Ild.
id.
5

532(a).

§ 532(b) (1). See also id. § 542.
§ 532(b) (2). See also id. § 552.
§ 532(b) (3). See also id. subch. F.

§ 533.

§ 533(a).

'O1d. § 533(b).
11

Id.
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under procedural principles generally applicable to income tax litigation.12
In response to complaints of unfairness in the assessment of deficiencies
in the area of accumulated earnings taxes, based on the government's poor
record in litigation and the difficulty and expense to taxpayers in establishing that an accumulation was for the reasonable needs of business,"
Congress enacted section 534 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 534 provides a procedure whereby the taxpayer may shift the burden
of proof on the issue of reasonable business needs to the Commissioner in a
proceeding before the Tax Court. If a notice of deficiency is based in
whole or in part on an allegation that earnings were accumulated beyond
the reasonable needs of business, the burden of proof is on the Commissioner unless, before the notice is mailed, the taxpayer is notified that the
proposed deficiency includes an accumulated earnings tax.14 The taxpayer
may shift the burden of proof back to the Commissioner" if, within sixty
days after notification, it submits a statement of the grounds and supporting facts on which it relies to establish that the accumulation is not
beyond the reasonable needs of business,"6 provided the statement recites
the grounds with clarity and specificity and the supporting facts are substantial, material, definite, and clear, and wherever possible, disclose the
dollar amount of funds retained for each business need 7 Section 534 only
shifts the burden of proof as to reasonable business needs so that the taxpayer still has the burden of establishing the non-existence of tax avoidance motivation for the accumulation. However, if the court finds that the
accumulation was for a reasonable business need, this burden becomes insignificant under the credit provided for such accumulations by section
535(c) (2)."
In the past the relief Congress sought to provide by the enactment of
section 534 has not been afforded to corporate taxpayers because the Tax
Court would not rule in advance of trial on the adequacy of section 534
statements.' 9 Uncertain therefore that the burden of proof had shifted to
the Commissioner, tax counsel have continued to present all available evidence of reasonable business purpose. Perhaps the first time tax counsel
has had the "abnormally strong nervous system"" required to rest a client's
case entirely on the burden of proof issue and the failure of the Commissioner to discharge his burden under section 534 was in Rhombar Co. v.
Commissioner, 386 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1967).
"TAX
CT. R. PRAC. 32. See also J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 50.61
(rev. ed.
1965).
13H.R. REP. No. 133, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.52 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.

68

(1954).
4

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 5 34(a)(1)(b).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 55 534(a)(2), 534(c).
6

' Treas. Reg. § 1.534-2(d)(2) (1959).
" Bremerton Sun Publishing Co., 44 T.C. 566 (1965); Ted Bates & Co., P-H Tax Ct. Mer.
5 65,251 (1965).
IsINT. REV. CODE of 1954, §5 35(c) (2).
9
Barrow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 294 F.2d 79 (5th Cir. 1961); Raymond I. Smith, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1961); Shaw-Walker Co., 39 T.C. 293 (1962); I.A.
Dress Co., 32 T.C. 93 (1959), aff'd, 273 F.2d 543 (2d Cir. 1960); Pelton SteelCasting Co.,
28 T.C. 153, 174 (1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d 278 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 958 (1958).
" B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS § 6.08, at 234 (1966).
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Rhombar Co., a closely held corporation owned almost entirely by the
H. M. Rothschild family, operated a furniture business under the trade
name of John Stuart, Inc. In 1952 it sold all its business assets, including
the right to use the Stuart trade name, to John Widdicomb Co., Inc.,
another closely held corporation in which the Rothschilds had a controlling
interest after the sale. Thereafter, Widdicomb operated Rhombar's former
business under the Stuart name and Rhombar accumulated its income,
derived entirely from dividends, interest and capital gains from the sale
of securities and from the installment payments received from Widdicomb. Consequently, surplus increased from $1,167,648 on January 31,
1954, to $2,382,494 on January 31, 1963, while dividends were limited to
$700 per year.
The Commissioner assessed deficiencies for the fiscal years ending January 31, 1960, 1961, and 1963, under the accumulated earnings tax provisions. Pursuant to section 534 Rhombar filed a thirteen-page statement
detailing its efforts to acquire another furniture business and alleging that
the reasonable needs of business required it to maintain a reserve equal at
least to its entire net worth to a minimum of $3,500,000 in order to finance an acquisition program of purchasing interests in furniture manufacturing businesses and facilities. In the Tax Court, Rhombar contended
that this statement shifted the burden of proof to the Commissioner and
offered no evidence. The Tax Court upheld the deficiency assessment on
the ground that the corporation was a "mere holding or investment company" within the terms of section 533 (b).2 On appeal the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that a taxpayer's statement, if sufficient, will shift the
burden of proof of unreasonable accumulations to the Commissioner under
section 533 (a), but the taxpayer still has the burden of proving it was
not a mere holding or investment company under section 533 (b). Therefore a failure to introduce any evidence to rebut the statutory presumption
will result in a decision for the Commissioner. 2
A deficiency determination based on the accumulated earnings tax provisions properly raises both the issues of unreasonable accumulations and
the status of the taxpayer corporation as a mere holding or investment
company." Since section 533 creates two alternative presumptions, tax
counsel must be prepared to rebut either or both by a preponderance of the
evidence. Thus reliance on section 534 statements will not be sufficient in
many cases. Should the Commissioner rely on the provisions of section
533 (b), the deficiency could be sustained unless the taxpayer introduces
sufficient evidence to discharge his burden of proof. In this respect the
question of reasonable business purpose and the shifting burden of proof
under section 534 would never be reached.'
Most corporate taxpayers should not be unduly burdened by the necessity of proving they engaged in activities other than "holding property
"1INT.

R~v. CODE of 1954, § 533(b).

2 Rhombar Co. v. Commissioner, 386 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1967).
23Stanton Corp., 44 B.T.A. 56 (1941), afi'd, 138 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1943); cf. Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238 (1937); Brook v. Commissioner, 360 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1966).
'This in essence is the precise situation in Rhombar. See 47 T.C. at 90.
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and collecting the income therefrom or investing therein."' Once this
burden is satisfied and a proper statement has been filed under section 534,
the burden of establishing the absence of a reasonable business purpose for
the accumulations in question should be on the Commissioner.
A recent Tax Court case clarifies the status of section 534 statements.
In Chatham Corporation" the court set forth the proper procedure for
obtaining pre-trial rulings on the sufficiency of section 534 statements to
shift the burden of proving that accumulations are beyond the reasonable
needs of the business. Past practice has been to submit a motion as to the
sufficiency of the statement to the judge of the motions calendar in advance of trial." In Chatham the motion was submitted to the trial judge
before whom the case was to be tried when the case was called for trial.
The court ruled on the motion in advance of the hearing on the merits
and apparently indicated that it will continue to so do if the same procedure is followed by counsel in future cases.2" Thus the necessity of
counsel with an extremely strong nervous system and the dangers of relying solely on section 534 statements in the absence of pre-trial rulings have
been eliminated. With Chatham it appears that the relief Congress sought
to provide taxpayers in enacting section 534 may at last become available.
S.C.S.

Taxation -

Traveling Expense -

Sleep or Rest Rule

Taxpayer was a traveling salesman for a wholesale grocery company in
Tennessee. He customarily left home early in the morning, ate breakfast
and lunch on the road, and returned home in time for dinner. He deducted the cost of his breakfast and lunch as traveling expenses incurred
in the pursuit of business while away from home under section 162 (a) (2)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.1 Since the daily trips required neither sleep nor rest, the Commissioner disallowed the deductions. The taxpayer sued in district court and received a favorable jury verdict. The
Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Commissioner's sleep or rest rule
is not "a valid regulation under the present statute."' Held, reversed: A
taxpayer may not deduct the cost of meals while away from home unless
the trip required either sleep or rest, regardless of how many cities a given
trip may have touched, how many miles it may have covered, or how
many hours it may have consumed. United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299
(1967).
Section 162 (a) (2) allows a deduction for traveling expenses (including
amounts expended for meals and lodging) while away from home in the
25Treas. Reg. § 1.533-1(c) (1959). Discharging this burden is doubly important to corporate
taxpayers in view of § 535(c) (3) limiting the accumulated earnings credit of mere holding and
investment companies to $100,000. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, S 535(c)(3); Treas. Reg. 5
1.535-3 (c) (1959).
2Chatham
Corp., 48 T.C. 145 (1967).
27
1d. at 146.
28 Id.

1INT.

REv. CODE of 1954, § 162(a)(2).
2 369 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1966).
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pursuit of a trade or business.' The question often raised is whether the
Code requires both meals and lodging as a prerequisite to deduction or
whether the deduction of meals is independent from overnight lodging.
The Commissioner has consistently contended that "the fundamental test
for determining whether the taxpayer incurred the meal expenses 'while
away from home' has been whether or not his business travel was of such
nature that it required him to seek lodging or at least sufficient time to
sleep or rest."4 The question of whether "meals and lodging" is to be read
in the conjunctive has produced varied results in the courts of appeals.
The First Circuit, in Commissioner v. Bagley,' upheld the Commissioner's
sleep or rest rule, while the Eighth Circuit rejected it in Hanson v. Commissioner' and United States v. Morelan.7
The Supreme Court in Correll has settled the conflict among the circuits by upholding the Commissioner's sleep or rest rule. It is now apparent that the day traveler, the man who leaves his home in the morning
and returns in the evening without a stopover for sleep or rest, is put on
a similar tax footing with intracity travelers and commuters, who cannot deduct the cost of meals they eat on the road. 8 The Court noted that
Congress has delegated to the Commissioner the task of prescribing "all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement" of the Internal Revenue Code, 9 and that the role of the judiciary in cases of this sort begins
and ends with assuring that the Commissioner's regulations fall within his
authority to implement the congressional mandate in some reasonable manner.1" The Court also noted the rule to be consistent with expressed legislative intent."'
As the dissent pointed out, due to the increased availability of high
speed travel it is possible for a man to be in Los Angeles for breakfast,
New York for lunch and back in Los Angeles for dinner. To say that this
man cannot deduct the cost of his meal because he was not away from
home overnight seems questionable. Yet as the Court noted, no one has
come up with a better solution.

J.J.K.

dINT. REV.

CODE Of

4

1954, § 162(a) (2).

Hanson v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 1962).
5374 F.2d 204 (1st Cir. 1967).
6298 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1962).
7356 F.2d 199 (8th Cir. 1966).
'See Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465 (1946).
9
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7805(a).
'0389 U.S. at 307.

" Id. at 305.

